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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAIR SORENSON, 
Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 15916 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and JEFFERY LYNN NELSON, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondent nelson sought benefits under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act for injuries which he alleges he suffered 
while performing certain projects for appellant. 
DISPOSITION BY THF. INDUSTRIAL C0"4MISSION 
The evidence was heard by Kenneth Rigtrup, Administra-
tive Law Judge, on March 15, 1976. The Order of the Industrial 
Commission was signeQ by Joseph C. Foley, Administrative Law 
Judge, on April 14, 1978 in which respondent Nelson was awarded 
compensation pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act. The 
Commission denied appellant's Motion For Review on June 19, 
1973. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant asks the court to reverse the order 
of the Industrial Commission or to remand the cause for a 
full hearing and determination by a single Administrative Law 
Judge 
STATEME~T OF FACTS 
Appellant Blair Sorenson was, at all times pertinent 
to this case (February 1975 - August 1975), a full-time electric( 
at Hill Air Force Base (R. 99). In addition, Mr. Sorenson 
owned as investments ten pieces of real estate on which apart-
ments or houses were situated (R. 126). 
I 
Respondent Jeffery L. Nelson was, at all times perti-[ 
nent to this case, either a full-time student (R. 66), a full- r 
time eDLployee of various construction companies (R. 76, 77, 78), 
or unemployed (R. 77, 78). In addition, He 1 son completed 
five projects for appellant at various investment properties 
owned by appellant. 
In February, 1975 Sorenson met Nelson in a class t~ 
were taking together at the University of Utah (R. 71). At 
that time, Nelson was a full-time student looking for part-
time work as a carpenter (R. 71). .Sorenson, upon discovering 
that Nelson was a carpenter, asked Nelson if he would like to 
give him a bid on a fire-burned floor in one of Sorenson's 
apartments (R. 103, 104). Nelson stated that he would do the 
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independent contractor (R. 103). The cost of the work was 
covered by an insurance policy Sorenson had on his apartment 
building (R. 103, 104). 
On February 22, 1975 Nelson and Sorenson painted an 
apartment that Sorenson owned (540 East. Seventh South) and 
Sorenson paid Nelson with a check for $18.00 (R. 34, 73, 107, 
130). The painting, which took approximately five hours, was 
the first of the five jobs that Nelson was to complete (R. 34). 
The second project was in March, 1975 when Nelson helped 
Sorenson put a bathtub in an apartment (540 East Seventh South). 
That project took approximately one hour and Sorenson paid 
Nelson with a check for $5.00 (R. 38, 115). 
In April, 1975 Nelson moved into one of Sorenson's 
apartments (R. 30). After this point in time, all work done 
by Nelson was credited to an outstanding debt he owed Sorenson 
for rent. Sorenson was, in all instances after April, 1975, simply 
allowing Nelson to work off rent due by arranging projects 
for Nelson to complete (R. 107, 129). 
On June 7, 1975, Nelson, using his own tools, worked 
four to five hours installing new sheetrock and soundboard 
at a Sorenson-owned apartment located at 1125 Princeton (R. 43, 
14, 74, 106, 107, 256). Sorenson had met Nelson on the pre-
vious day at the Princeton location and Sorenson showed Nelson 
what work needed to be done (R.43). Nelson, having the necessary 
skills and equipment, completed the project by himself without 
any direction from Sorenson (R. 75, 256). 
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Nelson finished the Spring quarter at the University 
of Utah on June 10, 1975 and went to work for Bishop's Castles 
as a carpenter (R. 76). Nelson was employed there until 
July 7, 1975 (R. 76). Around July 4, 1975, Nelson helped 
Sorenson install a new kitchen cabinet in Sorenson's 1144 ~~ 
Fifth South apartments (R. 78). The project was completed 
over several days with the work being done on a part-time basis 
(R. 46). 
From July 7, 1975 to August 1, 1975, Nelson was 
unemployed (R. 77, 78). At the end of July, 1975 Nelson com-
pleted the fifth project that Sorenson had given him. Nelson 
and Sorenson painted one of the apartments in the structure 
located at 1144 East Fifth South (R. 47, 48). On August 1, 
1975 Nelson went to work full-time with the Ron J. Stacey 
Construction Company, where he remained employed until August 
15, 1975 (R. 51, 67). llelson quit his job with Stacey believin· 
that he would soon have another job as a carpenter with Kahley I 
Construction Company (R. 86). 
On August 27, 1975 Nelson undertook a project which 
Sorenson described to him the day before (R. 52, 122, 123) · . I 
Sorenson told Nelson that the buildina at 1144 East Fifth Soutr 
needed to be prepared for painting an~ that Nelson should scra;:/ 
and wash the building (R. 88, 122, 123). Nelson, on August 27 1 
and 29, proceeded to scrape and wash down tl1e building in the 
manner and using the method which he chose. Nelson was not to'.I 
by Sorenson how he was to complete the project or when he was 
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to work on it. Sorenson only instructed Nelson to complete 
the project (R. 49, 90, 122, 123). 
On August 29, 1975 Nelson, while scrubbing down 
the apartment building, fell off the ladder he was using and 
suffered injuries to his right arm and leg, such injuries 
resulting in a claim filed with the Industrial Commission 
for workmen's compensation (R. 55). 
Summarizing the circumstances surrounding the 
activities of Nelson and Sorenson, Nelson only worked for 
Sorenson on a part-time weekend basis (R. 86). Sorenson knew 
of Nelson's full-time jobs and the fact that Nelson was look-
ing for full-time employment with construction companies 
during periods of unemployment (R. 91). Nelson was never told 
that there was any definite amount of work or projects avail-
able (R. 124, 144). Nelson stated that no definite time period 
was ever mentioned by Sorenson regarding how long projects would 
remain available to be worked on (R. 91). Nelson supplied his 
own tools when he was completing carpentry projects while 
Sorenson only supplied tools and materials for painting projects 
completed by Nelson (R. 256) . 
Sorenson worked full time for Hill Air Force Base 
during all times pertinent to the case (R. 99). In addition, 
Sorenson was attending the University of Utah as a fu.11-time 
student (R. 124). Sorenson's 19 rental units on ten pieces of 
real estate are simply investments (R. 126). The minimum 
amount of upkeep required has been handled by Sorenson or 
-5-
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contracted out to independent contractors (R. 120, 132). (NJ 
references to "respondent" in Argument sections that follow 
are to Jeffery Nelson, unless otherwise noted.) 
ARGUME:1T 
I. 
THE ORDER OF THE INDUST~IAL comuSSION SHOULD 
BE REVERSBD SINCE APPELLANT WAS NOT AN E!1PLOYER 
AS DEFINED UNDER sr:CTION 35 1-42 OF THE \vORK'1F.NS 
COMPENSATION ACT 
The Workmen's Compensation Code, Section 35-1-42, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), expressly provides the following 
definition of an employer: 
"Every person, firn and private corporation, 
including every public utility, having in 
service one or more workmen or operatives 
regularly employed in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under any 
contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, except agricultural laborers and 
domestic service; 
"The term 'regularly' as herein used shall 
include all employment in the usual course of 
the trade, business, profession or occupation of 
the employer, whether continuous throughout the 
year or for only a portion of the year." 
It is the contention of appellant that the ovmership 
and maintenance of his rental units is an investment and not a 
business within the meaning of the aforementioned Workmen's 
Compensation Code. The Supreme Court of Utah, in Sommerville ·I 
v. Industrial Cornm'n, 113 Utah 504, 196 P.2d 718 (1948), reaches, 
a similar conclusion. In that case, plaintiff, the claimant I 
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, was injured while workinc I 
on a building owned by the defendant and leased to another for 
retail grocery business. The defendant hired the plaintiff' 
- h -
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course of such work was injured. The Court determined that 
the defendant, who earned her livelihood as a restaurant owner, 
was not engaged in the real estate or rental business as that 
term is used within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and stated: 
"It is true that the property upon which 
plaintiff was working when he was injured 
\vas rental property from which presumably 
Hrs. Cook derived some income. But there 
is nothing in the record to indicate that 
she spent any substantial portion of her 
time in managing or operating this pro-
perty, and it was not part of her trade 
or business within the meaning of the 
statute. It was a matter of investment. 
See Clausen v. Dinnebeil, 125 N.J.L. 223, 
15 A.2d 205; Ostile v. H. F. Kirks & Son, 
189 Minn. 34, 248 N.W. 283; Ford v. 
Industrial Acc. Comm., 53 Cal. App. 542, 
200 P.667; Setter v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 
447, 37 P.2d 50; and Annotation at 50 A.L.R. 
1176. 
"This is not to say that one may not be 
engaged in two or more businesses, or a 
profession or trade and a business at the 
same time, and be responsible under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act in both or all 
fields of activity. Nor do we hold that 
the owning and operating of real estate for 
rental purposes may not, in some instances, be 
a business within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Act. Our holding is 
limited to the facts of this case, i.e., that 
where a person owns one piece of real estate 
which he 'rents out' to tenants, but does 
not either personally or by agent devote a 
substantial amount of time to the operation 
or management of such property, the owning 
and renting of such property does not consti-
tute a business within the meaning of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
"Therefore, Mrs. Cook was engaged in the 
coffee shop business, and the building upon 
which plaintiff was working at the time of 
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his injury was wholly disconnected from 
and unrelated to that business. Since 
we have held that the o~ming and renting 
of this property did not constitute 'a 
trade, business or occupation', within 
the meaning of the Act, and since this 
property was in no wise connected with 
the coffee shop business, it follows 
that the services being rendered by 
palintiff at the time of this accident was 
not necessary to, in furtherance of or a part 
of plaintiff's usual trade, business, or 
occupation, and, hence under the rules and 
definitions previously laid down by this 
court, his employnent (if he were an employee 
at all) would be only casual, and therefore 
he would not be entitled to compensation 
under the act." (196 P.2d at 721) 
whether j The case further dealt with the question of 
plaintiff's relationship to the defendant was that of an em-
ployee or an independent contractor. The Court in this regard 
found the applicant to be an independent contractor since defen· 
dant did not attempt to control the work in any particular 
manner, but on the contrary, merely showed the plaintiff and 
another what work she wanted done and left it entirely up to . ·.I 
plaintiff as to the method or manner of accomplishing the desu0 
result. The defendant, however, did supply all of the tools 
and materials needed for the job and agreed to pay plaintiff 
on an hourly basis. The Court, notwithstanding these facts, 
held: 
"It is now well settled in this juris-
diction that the crucial factor in deter-
mining whether an applicant for work-
men's compensation is an employee or an 
independent contractor is whether or not 
the person for whom the services were 
performed had the right to control the 
execution of the work. See the recent 
- 8 - l 
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case of Christean v. Industrial Comm'n., 
Utah, 196 P.2d 502, reviewing most of the 
Utah cases on this question." (196 P.2d 
at 720) 
An authoritative case concerning the issue of whether 
the renting of apartments if deemed to be a business within 
\Vorkmen's Compensation is Marsh v. Groner, 102 A.127 (Pa., 1917). 
The facts involved therein are relatively simple. The defendant 
was a married woman residing with her husband in a house owned 
by herself, and in the course of enlarging and remodeling this 
home engaged the plaintiff to do some plastering work about the 
premises, which would have required at most a couple of days to 
complete. The claimant had been engaged in work for only a 
short period of time when the scaffolding on which he was stand-
ing gave way and he fell to the ground, sustaining injuries. 
The Court stated: 
"It is an indispensable condition to his 
recovery under this act that the claimant 
show that he received his injury while en-
gaged in the regular course of the business 
of his employer. Section 104 of the act reads: 
"'The term "employee" [sic], as used in this 
act, is declared to be synonymous with servant, 
and includes all natural persons who perform 
services for another for a valuable consider-
ation, e;.(clusive of persons whose employment 
is casual in character and not in the regular 
course of the business of the employer.' 
"We derive from this by necessary implication 
that onlv such employers are made liable under 
the act ;;s are themselves engaged in regular 
business. This must be so if any effect 
whatever is to be given the exclusion clause 
. . . What gives rise to the question is the 
indefiniteness and want of precision of mean-
ing of the word 'business' as it occurs in 
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the act. It is a word which enbraces a wide 
variety of subjects, and, being without a 
technical or precise meaning, excluding any 
other, it may convey an entirely different 
meaning in one connection from what it im-
ports when used in another . . . It would 
be a very exceptional person--we do not know 
how to otherwise describe him--who would not 
understand that the reference is to the 
habitual or regular occupation that the 
party was engaged in with a view to winning 
a livelihood or some gain. These objects 
are necessarily implied when one's business 
is spoken of. Eliminate them, livelihood 
and gain, arid it is no longer business, but 
amusement, which no one ever confounds with 
business " (102 A. 2d at 128). 
Clearly, the overwhelming preponderance of evidence 
establishes that the appellant in the present case, while the 
owner of several apartment units, operated such property at a 
loss in excess of $4,000 for 1975. Appellant's livelihood and 
income was derived from his employment as an electronic tech· 
nician at Hill Air Force Base. Therefore, it cannot be conclude 
that the renting of apartment units is any more than a passive I 
investment when viewed in light of the surrounding circumstance I 
establishing the limited amount of time spent by appellant in 
managing such units and the lack of income therefrom. 
Numerous other states have determined that the mere 
owning of a building, maintaining it and keeping it in repair [ 
so that it may produce income is not sufficient to constitute cf 
trade or business within the l\lorkmen' s Compensation Act. ~1 
v. Wilson, 140 Kan. 447, 37 P.2d 50 (1934), and Ford v. Ind~ 
Comm'n, 53 Cal. App. 542, 200 P.667 (1921), wherein the Court 
- 10 - I 
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held that an owner who lets his house for profit and at 
irregular times when demanded has labor performed in the repair 
thereof is not engaged in the pursuit of a "trade" or "business" 
within the Workmen's Compensation Act. As the Court stated: 
[T]he petitioner herein had no business 
other than renting the building for profit. 
Upon the authority thereof we can but re-
peat that where an individual invests his 
money in a house or houses which as owner he 
lets for profit, and at irregular times when 
demanded has labor performed in the repair 
thereof, he is not engaged in the prosecu-
tion of a trade or business, within the 
meaning of the act and upon which a charge 
as compensation for injury sustained by an 
employee casually engaged in doing such work 
can be imposed." (200 P. 668) 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Billmayer v. 
Sanford, 225 N.W. 426, held that a woman owning rental property 
accommodating some eight or nine tenants was not engaged in 
business within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
when the claimant, who was hired to perform certain work on 
such property, was injured. The Court specifically held that 
the owning and letting of these houses did not constitute a 
business. In addition, the Court determined that the plaintiff, 
who was engaged to perform certain work on the rental property 
on a daily basis for approximately three weeks, was engaged in 
"casual employment" within the meaning of the Workmen's Campen-
sation Act. The Court stated: 
" •.• A thing is casual when it comes with-
out regularity and is of comparatively minor 
importance. It is usually temporary and of 
short duration. Where the employment cannot 
be characterized as permanent or periodi-
- 11 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
cally regular, but occurs by chance, or 
with the intention and understanding 
on the part of both employer and employee 
that it shall not be continuous, it is 
casual. 
"Relator did not need a regular employee. 
She had some odd jobs to be done. They 
were of unknown but short duration. She 
was not carrying on any business or occu-
pation. The employment was necessarily 
understood by both parties as temporary. 
It could not be continuous. It was a mere 
incident. It was an occasional irregular 
employment. The very nature of the work 
leads to the conclusion that the employment 
was cas•<1l. The \'Tork was of a casual nature. 
Where one is not employed in a business, 
trade, occupation, or profession, the employee 
is not within the act unless his employment 
is stable." (225 N.W. at 427) 
The uncontradicted facts of the instant case show that i 
respondent in the past was employed on a casual basis and had no 
reasonable anticipation of working on any continuing basis for 
appellant. In fact, the job in question was never completed, 
and no additional work of any sustained nature was performed by 
appellant on his rental property for the balance of the year 
after respondent's accident on August 29, 1975. Moreover, resp::! 
dent admitted that he was actively seeking full-time employment J 
I 
and had an application outstanding at the time for work with a 
general contractor in this area. 
Other jurisdictions holding that the mere renting and 
repairing of rental uni ts is not a business within the meaning 
of the Workmen's Compensation statute are as follows: ~I 
Dinnebeil, 125 N.J.L. 223, 15 A.2d 205; People ex rel Voel~I 
Browne, 52 N.Y.S.2d 822, 268 App. Div. 596. see al so in this , 
- 12 -
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regard 50 A.L.R. 1176, An~otation, listing those cases holding 
that an owner of rental property is not engaged in a business. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Morgan v. Salt Lake City, 
78 Utah 403, 3 P.2d 510 (1931), was faced with the situation of 
whether a statute authorizing a municipality to collect a 
license fee from a private corporation or business was applicable 
to a person maintaining a room open to the public where cards 
were being played. The Court, in determining that this was not 
a business within the meaning of the licensing statute, held 
that: 
"What ordinarily is meant by the term 'busi-
ness'? It is a pursuit or occupation in 
which a person is engaged to procure a living. 
It is synonymous with calling, occupation, or 
trade, and is defined as any particular 
occupation or employment habitually engaged 
in for a livelihood or gain." 
It is submitted that the issue of whether the renting 
of apartment units constitutes a business must be evaluated in 
light of the time spent by the apartment owner in managing the 
business and the income, if any, realized from such pursuit. 
In the event that a person is not engaged in the buying and 
selling of realty but rather in investing in land and real 
estate for income purposes, it is no more than a passive 
investment. This is buttressed by the fact that a relatively 
small portion of appellant's time is actually spent in the 
management of apartm2nt units. In fact, appellant's full-time 
occupation requires approximately ten hours of his time and 
school requires 12 to 15 hours per week, leaving very little 
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time left for the man;,ement of another business. 
When all of the facts and circumstances are · viewed, 
it must be concluded that the renting of apartment units does 
not constitute a business within the meaning of the \·lorkmen's 
Compensation Act. 
II. 
RESPONDENT WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTR.A..CTOR AS 
DEFINED UND!::R THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT 
The uncontradicted facts establish that respondent, 
while engaged in work on August 27 and August 29, 1975, was 
performing work pursuant to an understanding that he would 
receive a $4 per hour credit on rent which he was obligated to 
pay appellant but that the time and manner in which the work 
was to be performed was not controlled by appellant. The 
Supreme Court of Utah, in numerous cases, has held that the 
test of an employment relationship is whether the employer 
retains supervision and control over the work to be performed. 
See Weber County-Ogden City Relief Committee v. Industrial Com.-
93 Utah 85, 71 P.2d 177 (1937); Overman v. Industrial Cornm'n, 1 
Utah 468, 136 P.2d 945 (1943); Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Colfu1' 
113 Utah 347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948). 
The fact situation in the present case comes square!; 
within the ruling of the Sommerville case, supra. The respond' 
retained control over when his working l'eriods begun and ended 
notwithstanding the fact that the supplies and materials were 
Ilk•de available by appellant. At no time during the day of 
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August 27 did appellant supervise or control t!'le work performed 
by respondent, and when the work was continued on August 29, it 
was done on the same basis. 
The clear understanding between the parties was that 
respondent would receive $4 per hour credit for work performed. 
The facts therefore conclusively establish that respondent was 
an independent contractor rather than an employee of appellant. 
This is further supported by the previous employment history of 
respondent which involved unsupervised work involving either 
his performance of carpentry work, in which he is an experienced 
journeyman, or in simple manual tasks, none of which required 
the direct supervision of appellant. 
It is further submitted that the work performed by 
respondent in most cases was work performed in order to reduce 
a pre-existing debt, i.e., the payment of rent to appellant. 
In fact, with the exception of two checks--one for $18 and one 
for $5 paid in March of 1975--no money was paid by appellant to 
respondent for work performed. To hold that respondent was 
an employee of appellant would subject all property owners deal-
ing in rental properties on an investment basis as employers, 
subject to the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was not contem-
plated by the legislators in the passage of such Act, and 
would be in clear contravention of the precise wording and intent 
of the statute and the law as enunciated in the Sommerville 
case, supra. 
Moreover, respondent was not receiving direct compensation 
- 15 -
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for services rendered, as is generally the situation in an 
employer-employee relationship. See i;:i this regard Todd Sch ~
for Boys. v. Industrial Comrn'n, 107 N.E.2d 745 (Ill. 1952). 
In Oberhansly v. Travelers Ins. Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 
295 P.2d 1093 (1956), the Utah Supreme Court stated that under 
the Workmen's Compensation Act it is essential that in resolvin 
an employee-employer relationship that some consideration be ir. 
fact paid or payable to an employee since the term employee 
indicates a person hired to work for wages as the employer may 
direct. 
In the instant case, respondent was not to receive~ 
direct compensation but rather a reduction in his rent, and it 
cannot be said that he was working for consideration within 
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
III. 
THE ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD 
BE REVERSED SINCE Al?PELLAN'!' WAS DENIED THE 
RIGHT TO HAVE A DECISION RENDERED BY THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHO HEARD THE EVIDENCE 
The appellant submits that the Administrative Law 
Judge's Findings of Fact, enumerated 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, which 
relate to factual determinations concerning the question of 
whether or not the respondent was or was not an independent con· 
tractor, are erroneous. The appellant, through testimony, 
established that the respondent was a journeyman carpenter and 
that while certain work was performed at the direction of the 
defendant, the manner and means by which the work was to be 
- 16 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
performed was not controlled or directed by the appellant, and 
that on most occasions the respondent supplied his own tools and 
was not always paid on an hourly basis. 
It is axiomatic in the cormnon law that the single most 
important criterion to be employed in evaluating the question 
of whether a person is an employee or an independent contractor 
is whether or not the appellant attempts to control or direct 
the actual execution of the work being performed or, rather, is 
in effect purchasing the end result. 
It is the appellant's position that the facts bearing 
on this issue were presented to the Administrative Law Judge, 
Kenneth Rigtrup, who did not issue the Findings of Fact in the 
instant decision because of his termination of service with the 
Industrial Commission. It is well established that as a matter 
of due process, the defendant is entitled to a decision by the 
Administrative Law Judge who has heard the conflicting testimony 
and can make appropriate credibility resolutions. In Crow v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 321 (1943), the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision of the Industrial Commission in a 
similar situation and stated: 
"This case, however, must be reversed for 
another reason. Commissioner Jugler, the 
only Commissioner who heard the evidence 
and saw the demeanor of the witnesses while 
testifying did not participate in the de-
cision, and as far as the record discloses, 
he made no findings, either written or oral, 
which made his opinion of the evidence 
available to the Commission in making its 
decision. Where, as in this case, the 
evidence is not entirely documentary and 
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there is sharp conflict in the evidence, 
the credibility, or lack thereof, of the 
witnesses is of paramount importance. Only 
a person who actually hears and sees a 
witness while testifying is in a position 
to determine the weight of credibility which 
be given to such testimony. The opinion of 
such person is a necessary factor in mak-
ing any findings of fact. This situation 
is analogous to that of a judg~ who has 
tried a case, sitting without a jury, and 
whose office is either terminated or he 
resigns or dies before he has made the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. As 
stated in Case v. Fox, et al, 138 Ore. 453, 
7 P.2d 267, Pg. 268, ' . we can readily 
perceive that a successor to a trial judge 
who was removed by death before he had an-
nounced any findings of fact, or had in any 
other manner announced judgment upon the cause, 
could not render findings of fact . . '" 
For the reasons advanced above, appellant further oi-
jects to the findings set forth in paragraphs 10 and 11 of t~ 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Simple justice requi: 
that the Administrative Law Judge who heard the disputed testi:' 
concerning appellant's disability should decide such issue. 
While the appellant did not object to the findings of the Medi: 
Panel, it is also manifest that the Commission can consider te' 
many of the respondent that he engaged in certain sporting acti 
ties while allegedly totally disabled and respondent's doctor'' 
statement to the effect that the respondent had no permanent 
disability. It is not clear from the decision if such informa 
was considered by the Administrative Law Judge. Since the 
Administrative Law Judge was not present during the testimony 
the respondent and the appellant, any finding concerning the 
extent of disability, either permanent or partial, is suspect 
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and should be reversed. 
The appellant further submits that the rate of compen-
sation set forth in the Order was established without the taking 
of testimony in the presence of appellant concerning the average 
weekly wage of the respondent who was only casually engaged in 
work. 
IV. 
RESPONDENT FAILED TO EST.II.BLISH THE :·1ATURE AND 
EXTENT OF HIS INJURIES IN FRONT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HAKING THE FINAL 
DECISION 
It is the position of the appellant that the respondent 
has not met his burden of proof and has failed to establish 
the nature and extent of his injuries through competent medica_l 
evidence nor the extent of any alleged permanent or partial 
disability. At the hearing there was no medical evidence 
presented, and furthermore, the facts establish that within two 
weeks after the cast was removed from responde!lt's right hand he 
went on a hunting trip. His testimony, however, is that he 
cannot engage in any gainful employment and bases this on no 
more than his subjective testimony that his wrist hurts when 
he engages in certain kinds of activity. It is appellant's posi-
tion that the respondent should establish the nature and extent 
of his injury and any disability connected therewith in front of 
the Administrative Law Judge who will hear the conflicting testi-
mony and make the appropriate Findings of Fact. Moreover, an 
opportunity to review such findings in front of the AdmiTI~strative 
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Law Judge making the Findings of Fact should be afforded the 
appellant since the existence of a disability is, in the 
opinion of appellant, in dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's investments in nineteen rental units do 
not constitute a business and, thus, appellant is not an emplo;' 
under Section 35-1-42 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. To 
hold otherwise would subject the appellant and people similar!;' 
situated to requirements which would make the ownership of reai 
property investments impractical. The Utah court, in the 
Sommerville case, recognized the possibility of such an inequi'.' 
able result and held that the defendant was engaged in the 
business of managing a restaurant and owned the real estate 
solely as an investment. The reasoning of Sommerville should 
be applied to the instant case. 
Furthermore, respondent was an independent contracto: 
who simply completed specified projects in whatever manner and 
by whatever means he chose. Appellant had no control over hm1 
the work was performed or the time period in which it was to b; 
completed. 
Finally, due process considerations require a remand 
since appellant was denied the opportunity to have a single 
Administrative Law Judge render a decision on the facts and la' 
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For the above reasons, the order of the Industrial 
Commission should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
R?nald F. Sysak ~ 
ft'ttorneys for Appell.ii'nt, 
/ Blair Sorenson 
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